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This paper is quite different from the usual Japan Economic Seminar presentation. 
Rather than a piece of original research, this paper is a summary of personal views and 
reflections about the current status of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship. The purpose is 
to stimulate discussion at our seminar meeting about the relationship, somewhat in 
continuation of what transpired at the seminar's Washington meeting concerning Marcus 
Noland's paper. My motive is largely selfish; since I am heading to Tokyo in January to 
work as a special assistant to Ambassador Mondale on economic affairs, I am eager to listen 
to my colleagues in the seminar before departing. 
If there is a theme or conclusion to the following pages, it is that economists need to 
be less purely academic in their approach to bilateral issues. Important problems do exist in 
the bilateral relationship; they are not all necessarily true economic problems, but neither are 
they simply "political" issues which economists tend to view with disdain. Dealing with these 
problems obviously requires tact and diplomacy, but they can be ignored only at the peril of 
seriously damaging the overall economic and strategic relationship. Especially now that the 
cold war is over, and economic aspects of the U.S.-Japan relationship are receiving relatively 
more attention than in the past, economists have a responsibility to be closely involved in 
considering the nature of the problems and their possible solutions. 
The issues fall crudely into macroeconomic and microeconomic categories, although 
there is a fuzzy boundary between the two. Both sets of issues are important, and are 
considered separately below. In addition, the two nations face a wide ranging set of global 
and regional economic issues on which the two governments engage in discussions, some 
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cooperation, and some disagreement. These broader international issues are also a very 
important part of the relationship, but are not part of this paper. 
Macroeconomic Problems 
Economic theory provides little guidance concerning macroeconomic balances. 
Nations that have a surplus of domestic savings over desired levels of domestic investment 
are net exporters of capital to the world; those with insufficient domestic savings to finance 
desired levels of investment are net importers of capital. Especially if the capital importers 
are developing countries that desire to escape from their relative poverty, the availability of 
foreign capital becomes a means of overcoming the limitations of their domestic savings base. 
But even among industrial nations, net flows from surplus to deficit countries presumably 
represent an efficient flow, with capital seeking higher expected rates of return. Why should 
anyone care, then, if the United States ends up as a capital importer and Japan a large net 
exporter? 
This is the criticism generally raised by economists over the political use made of 
Japan's global current-account surpluses (or, worse yet, its bilateral trade surplus with the 
United States). The frequent political argument that Japan must liberalize its import markets 
because it has large surpluses is ludicrous from the standpoint of economic theory. The 
surpluses exist because of the working out of macroeconomic forces, and not because of the 
existence of import barriers; protectionist countries can have deficits, and open countries 
surpluses. How nations choose to behave domestically~in terms of incentives/disincentives 
for savings and investment, or the stance of monetary and fiscal policy—is their own business 
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under the regime of floating exchange rates begun in 1973. 
If Japan has a society that prefers to save heavily, has a level of investment (as a 
mature industrial economy) that is lower than the desired level of savings, and a government 
very wary of fiscal deficits, that is presumably the concern of the Japanese ajid no one else. 
If macroeconomic conditions in the rest of the world are amenable, the net surplus savings 
end up flowing to the rest of the world in the form of a current-account surplus and offsetting 
net capital outflow, as has been the case for more than the past decade. 
I believe that this standard view is somewhat flawed and naive for several reasons. In 
reality, both Japan and the United States have some reason to be concerned about their 
imbalances with the rest of the world, and even some reason to be concerned about the 
bilateral current-account or trade imbalance. From a U.S. perspective, the large current-
account deficits that emerged in the 1980s (especially against a backdrop of Japanese global 
surpluses) were not necessarily benign. In essence, the current-account deficits were a 
symbol of the relatively poor overall performance of the economy over the past two decades. 
Slower economic growth, the drop in productivity improvement, the secular decline of the 
dollar against major currencies, are all part of the relatively weak performance of the U.S. 
economy in an international setting. 
To the extent that this is true, American complaints about the bilateral trade imbalance 
or the global imbalances are really self criticism. The Japanese fear that they are being made 
the scapegoat for American problems, but, in fact, most thoughtful officials and politicians in 
Washington are well aware that solution to this problem is largely domestic. Eleanor Hadley 
pointed out many of these domestic sources of American problems with Japan back in 1979, 
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in a GAO study prepared for Senator Bentsen (then chair of the Joint Economic Committee).1 
Senator Bentsen had been calling for an import surcharge levied against all imports from 
Japan, but dropped this idea by the time the report was issued. 
Second, while capital inflow has filled the gap between domestic savings and 
investment, permitting a level of investment higher than would have been the case otherwise, 
this strategy came with real costs. Payment of interest or repatriation of profits on the stock 
of foreign investment represents a real transfer of future resources abroad (unlike the domestic 
redistributive effect of domestic debt). The fundamental question is whether the 
investment/growth impact of the net inflow of foreign capital outweighs the net loss from the 
repatriation of earnings. Since the Japanese may actually be losing money on their 
investments, perhaps the bargain was a worthwhile one for Americans. More seriously, the 
major outcome was not so much a rise in domestic investment as simply a widening of the 
federal budget deficit, driven by the combination of tax cuts and increased defense spending. 
It is far from clear that this was the best possible outcome for the nation over the course of 
the decade. A pattern of smaller government deficits, permitting the financing of domestic 
investment without a net inflow of foreign capital might well have been a preferable pattern. 
Japan, too, may have reasons to be dissatisfied with its large current-account surpluses. 
Management of foreign assets-portfolio, real estate, and overseas subsidiaries—all posed at 
least a transitional problem for Japan given the acute shortage of employees endowed with the 
necessary international skills to manage these assets. Despite allegations in the late 1980s 
General Accounting Office, United States-Japan Trade: Issues and Problems (GAO, ID-79-
53, September 21, 1979). See especially pp. 151-171. 
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that the Japanese were acquiring great power over the world because of their creditor 
position,2 the reality seems to be more one of a reluctant, inept, and naive investor. Major 
losses in property markets, international financial markets, and even the operation of some 
manufacturing subsidiaries attest to these problems. Nevertheless, given the unusual degree 
of Japanese isolation from the outside world in the earlier postwar period, these transitional 
problems are largely a welcome development.3 
Second, the Japanese face an important cyclical problem at the present time. The 
expectation of the Ministry of Finance appears to have been that export expansion in 1993 
would carry the economy out of recession, repeating the traditional business recovery process 
of the 1950s and 1960s. To pursue economic recovery through exports at a time when other 
major nations were experiencing low or negative growth amounts to an export of 
unemployment to other G-7 countries. Global economic conditions in 1993 are considerably 
different from the early 1980s, when Japan last exported its way out of a domestic slowdown. 
Whatever the narrow economic merits of an export-led recovery, this has serious political 
risks for Japan. These risks are exacerbated by the large size of Japan; when it pursued 
export-led recovery from economic slowdowns in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan was a small 
nation with a minor impact on the rest of the world. 
Economists should also keep in mind that our sterile models of surpluses/deficits, 
capital inflows/outflows all have important social and political implications. Even if a net 
2See for example, Daniel Burstein, Yen! Japan's New Financial Empire and Its Threat to America 
(Fawcett, 1990). 
3Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's New Global Role (Brookings, 1993) details the earlier isolation or 
insularity, and the major transformation that took place in the 1980s. 
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inflow of capital represented an economically rational American response to its economic 
situation in the 1980s, the result was severe competition for many American manufacturing 
industries or firms-including some that were efficient and well managed-as well as a rapid 
rise in the proportion of domestic assets that were foreign owned (after threerquarters of a 
century of low foreign ownership).4 These are major structural changes, with implications 
for job losses/gains in different industries or geographical parts of the country, and for 
arousing nationalist reactions against the intrusion of foreign ownership. Such dislocations or 
restructuring carry real economic and human costs, and it seems only natural that they lead to 
nationalistic resentment if the agent of change is competition from foreign firms. This may 
be especially an American problem, given the geographical size of the nation and the distinct 
lack of policies to ameliorate the personal costs involved in structural change. In general, 
political systems in deficit nations allow such foreign inroads to take place only if they have 
reason to be satisfied with the behavior of the surplus nations providing the competition and 
the capital associated with the changes. Japan, because it had not been a major investor prior 
to 1980, probably faced more attention with its large surpluses and capital outflow; Japan 
gained a visible presence abroad that had simply not existed before. 
But were the deficit countries, and particularly the United States, sufficiently 
comfortable with the behavior of Japan to gracefully accept the economic and social intrusion 
represented by the trade imbalance and the rapid inflow of capital? This is the crux of the 
macroeconomic problem. The answer is no. The fact that a nation believed to have 
4David Hale, "Will We Hate Japan as We Hated Britain?" The International Economy, January-
February, 1988. 
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relatively closed markets for goods and capital itself was becoming a major investor in the 
United States was unpalatable for many. When Britain faced chronic current-account 
surpluses in the 19th century, it suddenly espoused free trade (and, just as importantly, 
maintained an empire to absorb most of those surpluses without being able to argue back). 
When the United States faced chronic current-account surpluses in the postwar period, it, too, 
espoused free trade and engaged in policies to ease the "dollar shortage." What has Japan 
done to ease the way for international political acceptance of its current-account surpluses? 
Nothing, except to tell the world that the surpluses are a good thing. This seems like an 
especially inept response, and the dogged refusal to acknowledge problems of market access 
exacerbates the situation. 
Until Japan can demonstrate to the satisfaction of its trading partners that its markets 
are easily accessible, large current-account surpluses will continue to face strong resistance 
that is quite understandable. It is for this reason that the recent Advisory Committee on 
Trade Policy and Negotiations (ACTPN) report emphasizes that "while economists may argue 
that the trade deficit [with Japan] is not important, it has become a political lightning rod that 
is seriously undermining the relationship."5 
In addition, from a global perspective, a Japanese current-account surplus that is, to a 
large extent, with the United States, may not represent an efficient flow of international 
capital. One would expect that the economically efficient international flow of capital should 
be from developed countries to developing countries, and now, to those former communist 
5Major Findings and Policy Recommendations on U.S.-Japan Trade Policy: Report of the 
Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations, January 1993, p. 13. 
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countries undergoing systemic transformation. The rate of return in developing or 
transforming countries ought to be higher than in mature industrial countries, although this 
has often been negated in reality by the much higher risk factor caused by political instability 
in developing countries. Why, though, should a large net flow of capital from Japan to the 
United States be the most efficient or desirable choice for the global economy? Alteration of 
policies in both the United States and Japan to diminish the bilateral transfer, while 
maintaining the flow to developing countries ought to be desirable for long-term global 
economic welfare. 
Finally, the argument that Japan and the United States should simply decide what is 
best for their own economies is flawed as well. The Japanese response to American 
complaints about the macroeconomic situation has been rather consistently to tell the 
Americans to get their own house in order if they are not satisfied. But both nations live in 
an interdependent world. I wonder how seriously Japanese government officials really wanted 
the United States to reduce the "twin deficits" in the 1980s, since the United States 
represented such a convenient outlet for Japanese overseas investment during the 1980s. 
Without the United States as such a large absorber of Japanese surpluses, it is quite likely that 
Japan would have faced a situation quite similar to the recession of 1992-1993 in the early 
1980s instead. 
Believing that Japan should be completely free to set its macroeconomic policies also 
ignores the recent history of international interaction. Notions of G-7 responsibility for global 
growth have been around since at least the days of the "locomotive theory" of 1976-1977, 
even if the mechanisms for obtaining coordination are poor. Japan is currently in the midst 
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of recession, but is in the best position of any G-7 member to stimulate its economy through 
fiscal policy at the present time. The rapid rise of the current-account surplus is a 
consequence of the recession and failure to stimulate demand. Even if the current-account 
surplus per se is not a problem, certainly recession and the resistance of the .Ministry of 
Finance to fiscal stimulus are issues of legitimate international concern from this global 
perspective. 
Assuming that both nations, or the broader G-7 desire to stimulate growth or reduce 
current-account imbalances, some degree of cooperation is necessary. But how is that 
cooperation to occur? The approach preferred by the signers of the Bhagwati letter to 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Hosokawa seems to be the traditional economics 
approach: if a set of economics experts explains carefully and rationally to the Prime Minister 
that fiscal stimulus is a desirable policy for Japan, then surely such policies will materialize.6 
But suppose this approach does not work? Academic persuasion seems rather naive in this 
case. 
The letter decries the use of macroeconomic targets, but perhaps we should recognize 
that such suggestions have arisen precisely because academic explanation or friendly 
persuasion has not worked. We readily accept the notion of targets for domestic 
macroeconomic variables, such as the reduction of the federal budget deficit, as mechanisms 
to force the political and bureaucratic actors involved to come forth with policies that have a 
real impact even though the targeted variable may be subject to uncontrollable influences 
6,,An Open Letter to: Prime Minister Hosokawa and President Clinton," September 25, 1993, 
signed by Jaggdish Bhagwati, Paul Krugman, and others. 
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which make achievement of the target difficult (as is the case even with the federal budget 
deficit, since tax receipts vary with the pace of economic growth). Why, then, are we so 
reluctant to recognize the value of similar mechanisms in an international context? 
Economic policy formation in the domestic American context has always been a 
passionate exercise with active disagreements, imposition of targets/promises/limits, severe 
criticism when targets are unmet, and conflicting interpretations of outcomes. Why should 
the international context be any different? Are the Japanese so delicate that they can not 
withstand a little criticism? I believe that the bilateral relationship is sufficiently robust that it 
can and should withstand a considerable amount of pressure. If Japan were to commit itself 
to some sort of target for its current-account surplus, and failed to meet the targets, it would 
be criticized. So what? 
The answer to this question is fear that beyond criticism, the United States would 
resort to some form of retaliation in the even of Japanese failure to achieve macroeconomic 
targets. I doubt that reaction to failure would go beyond congressional resolutions or press 
conferences by cabinet secretaries, unless the failure were due to (unlikely) wilful rejection of 
the requested macroeconomic policies by the Japanese government. In such a case, 
retaliation, or at least the threat of retaliation is a possibility. This would be a dangerous 
precedent, and perhaps represents a serious enough possibility to avoid targets. Nevertheless, 
I certainly wish that the reverse had taken place in the 1980s, when Japanese retaliation 
against American macroeconomic failures (the inability to deal with the budget deficit) in the 
form of controls on capital flow from Japan to the United States (as difficult as such a policy 
would have been to enforce) might have had a favorable impact on the U.S. policy discussion. 
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If targets are repugnant in a bilateral context, an alternative approach for them might be for 
the G-7, OECD, or IMF to act as the body which announces non-binding macroeconomic 
goals, with nations failing to meet their goals to explain their failures at meetings of these 
bodies. 
In reality, the issue of macroeconomic targets appears to be moot. The framework 
agreement of July 1993 did not include any specific targets on current-account surpluses 
because of Japanese government resistance. To me, that resistance represents a lack of 
fundamental Japanese government (and primarily Ministry of Finance) commitment at that 
time to any real fiscal expansion policies to stimulate domestic demand and reduce the 
current-account surplus. Instead, we have had to rely on having senior U.S. government 
officials criticizing the fiscal policy stance of the Japanese government, and calling for 
expansion through a tax cut. Some see even this as unfair or unjustified interference by 
Americans in the internal affairs of Japan. But if we are in a situation where the United 
States is actually making some progress on correcting its own macroeconomic imbalances, 
needs Japan to cooperate in the process because of the mutuality of these relationships, but 
faces severe resistance from the Ministry of Finance, should U.S. government officials really 
refrain from criticizing Japanese policy? I think not. 
The only legitimate argument that could be made in the fall of 1993 was that Prime 
Minister Hosokawa was personally in favor of real fiscal stimulus, supported by most 
elements of the business community, and some government ministries. He was, therefore, 
likely to win the battle with the Ministry of Finance without American assistance. This 
contrasts with the more uniform front in opposition to fiscal stimulus presented by the LDP 
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governments from the early 1980s until the fall of Miyazawa in 1993. By September of 
1993, it seemed pretty clear that real fiscal stimulus in the form of an income tax cut would 
be approved by the end of the year because of the seriousness of the continuing recession. 
Nevertheless, one could argue that properly timed American statements may.,well result in a 
final decision for a degree of fiscal stimulus that will exceed what would otherwise 
materialize. What has been, and what should be, involved in this process are not threats of 
retaliation, sanctions, or other drastic measures, but simply the inclusion of comments by high 
U.S. officials about the importance of macroeconomic stimulus in Japan when such comments 
are deemed appropriate. As long as such statements are planned in a manner to accomplish 
goals, rather than simply representing angry backlash against perceived intransigence, they are 
an appropriate part of bilateral relations. 
In the longer run, the Japan's current-account surpluses should decline and disappear, 
driven largely by the rapid demographic changes taking place. This shift may take place by 
early in the next decade, but it is extremely difficult to predict. Meanwhile, the surplus could 
be quite high for the next several years, raising all the political concerns discussed earlier. 
Furthermore, complacency over the long-term change does not offset the problem of cyclical 
timing in 1993. 
In summary, Japan's present large and rising current surplus is a matter for legitimate 
international concern for both economic and political reasons. Continued policies to reduce 
the U.S. fiscal and current-account surplus are necessary, and require reciprocal Japanese 
adjustment. Substantial pressure-through targets or public criticism of Japanese 
macroeconomic policy-is a legitimate and necessary part of the process when carefully timed 
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and calibrated to positively affect the policy process in Japan. 
Microeconomic Problems 
Mutual economic gains from trade is one of the few bits of economic theory on which 
virtually all economists agree. Terms such as comparative advantage and free trade have 
passed from being theoretical economic constructs to tenets of ideology imbedded deeply in 
American politics. However, the comparative static models by which these concepts are 
explained to students have many shortcomings for policy makers trying to make progress 
toward the ideal. 
The essential problem comes from the process of removing or lowering barriers. 
Some purists seem to believe that free trade is such a clearly beneficial concept that a nation 
should simply adopt free trade unilaterally. Or conversely, there is the oft-heard argument 
that if the Japanese wish to follow protectionist policies, we should not care because they 
only hurt themselves. 
Economically this argument may be flawed. If a firm can protect a portion of its 
market, and thereby raise prices in that market segment, it can then cross-subsidize to meet or 
undercut competition in other markets (a pattern that has concerned economists since at least 
the short-haul/long-haul railroad rate problems of the late nineteenth century). If, in addition, 
technical change depends critically on generating profits, a firm with a segmented market and 
excess profits in the protected portions of its market may gain additional long-run advantages 
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over its competitors.7 A world in which one nation unilaterally adopts free trade while others 
do not could easily result in a one-shot static efficiency gain but a long-run deterioration in 
economic performance due to the inability to continue moving resources into higher value-
added industries because of advantages obtained by foreign firms working from protected 
bases. 
Because of such dangers inherent in unilateral trade liberalization, the world operates 
under a much more pragmatic institutional framework. Under the GATT, the only real 
principle is that of most-favored nation; nations may or may not choose to lower their trade 
barriers, but if they do, the deal cannot be restricted to one nation. In essence, the resulting 
process under the GATT has been a recursive game. Players choose to strike bargains, 
partially opening their own markets in exchange for concessions by trading partners believed 
to be roughly reciprocal. Continuation of the game depends on perception of the outcomes of 
previous rounds; if players are convinced that they received benefits equalling or exceeding 
the costs, they will play another round. 
This game was complicated by the existence of the cold war, in which the United 
States had non-economic motives for playing regardless of the behavior of its trading partners 
in order to solidify alliance relationships. From the time of the switch in occupation policy in 
1947, the emphasis was on promoting economic recovery in Japan. As C.G. Allen put it, this 
was motivated by the fact that "the widespread economic distress provided an uncongenial 
7This is essentially the sort of model underlying Laura D-andrea Tyson, who's Bashing Whom? 
Trade Conflict in High-technology Industries (Institute for International Economics, 1993), with 
the extension that in Japan and Europe governments systematically create both protected markets 
and subsidies to alter the terms of competition to their advantage. 
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environment for the growth of new democratic institutions."8 Edwin O. Reischauer echoed 
these attitudes, writing that "in the divided world that resulted from Communist 
intransigence, an economically unhealthy Japan was a serious liability to us rather than an 
asset."9 In the minds of U.S. government officials, an economically healthy Japan included 
permitting heavy protectionism on both merchandise and capital imports, out of an infant 
industry rationale. Japan was clearly viewed in this manner in the 1950s, when the U.S. 
government deliberately refused to further the interests of leading American businesses in 
Japan.10 
Because of the cold war, therefore, the recursive game of market opening was skewed, 
with Japan permitted to maintain strong barriers into the 1960s. Belatedly, these barriers 
began to come down, in a process that continues today. But the critical element here is that 
in the 1980s-and today-a growing number of American firms, unions, and government 
officials perceived that the process had not been reciprocal. The necessary underpinning for 
continuation of the process, therefore, was weakening, evidenced by the increased incidence 
of American protectionist actions in the first half of the 1980s directed at Japan. Especially 
during the 1980s, when relatively open markets for goods and capital in the United States, 
combined with a prolonged period of dollar strength, contributed to extensive economic 
restructuring (attended by geographical relocation of industry and the unemployment and 
8C. G. Allen, Japan's Economic Expansion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 17. 
9Reischauer, The United States and Japan, p. 293. 
10Mark Mason , American Multinationals and Japan: The Political Economy of Japanese Capital 
Controls, 1899-1980 (Harvard University Press, 1992) pp. 101-198, describes a number of 
specific episodes in which the U.S. specifically declined to assist American businessmen in their 
efforts to overcome barriers to entry in Japan in the 1950s. 
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other labor costs associated with those changes), dissatisfaction mounted concerning the status 
of access to Japanese markets. Despite some episodes of protectionist actions at home, 
however, the strength of American commitment to open markets meant that the main thrust of 
policy was to pressure Japan to lower its barriers. 
The nature of the continuing access problems to the Japanese market are now fairly 
well studied. Marcus Noland's recent paper provides an excellent summary of the arguments 
and problems.11 Exceptionally low levels of manufactured imports relative to GDP (or to 
GDP in manufacturing), low levels of intra-industry trade, low levels of inward direct 
investment, all cause Japan to stand out in comparison with other industrial countries. While 
some of the difference can be explained by standard economic variables, I am simply not 
convinced that these provide the entire explanation. Furthermore, the argument that all the 
differences are due to standard economic factors is totally at odds with the plethora of 
anecdotes about the extraordinary informal problems in doing business in Japan for foreign 
firms in many industries. While anecdotes may be an unreliable basis for analysis, any 
econometric analysis which completely negates or contradicts the evidence of actual business 
experience is suspect. 
Some firms operating in open markets will have competitive problems; this is simply 
the normal outcome of competitive processes. If the set of firms bringing complaints to 
Washington consists solely of the failures, while the successful firms remain largely silent, 
then the anecdotal evidence could provide a very skewed picture of the situation. However, 
nMarc Noland, "United States-Japan Trade Friction and Its Dilemmas for U.S. Policy", based 
principally on the new book by C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland, Reconcilable Differences? 
(Institute for International Economics, 1993). 
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one of the remarkable characteristics of the U.S.-Japan relationship is that some of the most 
successful firms are among the vocal critics. Companies that actually do substantial business 
in Japan, have a major commitment to understanding and adjusting to local customs, 
language, and rules, often express deep dissatisfaction with the nature and impact of the 
barriers thrown in their path relative to what they experience in other foreign markets. 
Among these firms are Motorola, Texas Instruments, Cray Computer, AT&T, and even 
Boeing Aircraft (with this latter firm generally positive in public, but quite candid in private 
about explicit pressure from MITI to increase the amount of value-added performed by 
Japanese subcontractors). These are firms that ought to be among the staunchest defenders of 
the bilateral relationship; often they are not. More broadly, the ACCJ, an organization often 
assumed to consist of the successful, satisfied, quiet American firms, recently behaved 
uncharacteristically by issuing a report quite critical of market access conditions.12 The fact 
that firms that ought to provide the constituency for harmony are part of the chorus of 
complainants suggests the depth of the problems. 
Many of the indicators of foreign penetration of Japan increased over the period from 
1985 to 1990, and the result was optimism concerning the direction of change. Japanese 
government officials pointed to the rise in the ratio of manufactured imports to GDP, or the 
rise in intra-industry trade and declared the problems to be gone.13 The ACCJ at that time 
12American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, 1993 United States-Japan Trade White Paper. 
13Among these efforts to refute the conclusion of Japan as an outlier on trade and investment are 
Mitsuo Hosen, "Heisasei Hihan e no Hanron" [a Response to Criticism of Closedness], Keizai 
Senta Kaiho, No. 619 (November 1990), Ryutaro Komiya and Kazutomi Irie, "The U.S.-Japan 
Trade Problem: An Economic Analysis from a Japanese Viewpoint," Discussion Paper Series, 
No. 90 (Tokyo: Research Institute of International Trade and Industry, May 1990); and Satoshi 
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commissioned a study by A.T. Kearney which interviewed American firms operating in Japan, 
and found most firms agreeing that the trade and investment environment had improved in the 
previous five years (without putting any quantitative dimensions on how sizable the 
improvement had been).14 
In retrospect, some of the change from 1985 to 1990 was inspired by an unsustainably 
high level of economic growth. The combination of five percent economic growth for several 
years, as well as asset inflation, induced an unusually rapid increase in imports, as one would 
expect. Imports of motor vehicles, for example, rose from $571 million in 1985, to $6.4 
billion in 1990, but then dropped substantially to $5.2 billion in 1992.15 Overall, the ratio of 
manufactured imports to GDP rose from 2.6 percent in 1985 to 3.8 percent in 1990, but then 
subsided to approximately 3.0 percent by 1992.16 
If the improvement in foreign market access in Japan was due to a set of extraordinary 
economic circumstances in the late 1980s, then substantial cause for concern remains. Recent 
upward movement of the yen provides a increased price advantages for foreign products in 
theory, but the recession may make penetration more difficult, at least for industrial products 
Kuwahara, "The Fallacy of Trade Ratios," Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry (January-
February 1992). 
14American Chamber of Commerce in Japan, Trade and Investment in Japan: the Current 
Environment, A Study for the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan Prepared by A.T. 
Kearney (Tokyo: ACCJ, 1991). 
15Bank of Japan, Balance of Payments Monthly, May 1993, p. 18. 
16Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's New Global Role (Brookings, 1993), p. 86, and Isaiah Frank, 'The 
U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship," paper prepared for the Committee for Economic 
Development, July 1993, p. 47. The ratio in for the United States, meanwhile, is close to 8 
percent, and for European countries 10 percent and above. 
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purchased by corporations which may be more reluctant to switch to a foreign product at the 
expense of a domestic supplier in a time of economic difficulty. 
In the long run, stagnation and decline in the size of the labor force implies higher 
labor costs, leading to a further shift toward imports, at least for labor-intensive products. If 
this process, though, relies heavily on Japanese firms importing from their own subsidiaries 
abroad, then the concerns of non-Japanese-affiliated firms will remain. Somewhere in the 
process of structural change, non-affiliated foreign firms must see greater advantages and 
opportunities within Japan for themselves if they are to continue their support for a liberal 
trade regime. 
How do we achieve progress on these problems? The problems raised above have led 
some to advocate managed trade, or voluntary import expansions (VIEs) as a solution, 
following along the route taken in semiconductors in 1986 and automobile parts in 1992. I 
find myself largely, but not entirely, opposed to such solutions. 
Managed trade is bad economics, negates our decades-long advocacy of less Japanese 
government intervention in the market, and undermines the global liberal trade framework. 
Why then, could anyone advocate it as an acceptable solution? There are two reasons why it 
is not a total loss: 
First, managed trade, and particularly the semiconductor agreement, became a 
powerful threat to the Japanese government and private sector. MITI played an important 
role in making the semiconductor agreement work, but it probably paid a major political cost 
in its relationship with Japanese industry in so doing. Industry resented the intrusion of 
MITI, and expressed its dissatisfaction. The lesson for the Japanese government is that, if 
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this painful process is to be avoided, then rules-based settlements had better be fully 
implemented and the anticipated impact of the change in the rules on trade flows had better 
occur. 
Second, think of managed trade as a form of affirmative action. One. could argue that 
labor markets worked efficiently in the United States in the 1950s; firms hired those people 
who they believed to be the best qualified for managerial positions, and who would fit best 
into their corporate cultures. Those people just happened to be almost entirely white males. 
As a nation, we then chose to introduce inefficiency into the market, forcing firms to hire 
women, blacks, and other ethnic minorities as a matter of social policy. While this may have 
caused economic inefficiency in the short run, the long-run impact was to alter social attitudes 
and behavior, with firms learning the economic value of women and minorities. 
Discrimination in American labor markets may not be gone, but the situation is far different 
from what it was 30 years ago, and Americans generally believe that their society and 
economy is better off because of the change. 
Managed trade is the international equivalent of this social policy. As part of the 
general insularity and nationalism of Japan's development in the postwar period, Japanese 
firms have often preferred limiting their business associations to other Japanese firms 
whenever possible. The problem with semiconductors, for example, was primarily that 
Japanese firms would not even talk with foreign manufacturers. Without dialogue, sales and 
business relationships cannot even begin. The semiconductor agreement forced reluctant 
Japanese firms together with American and other foreign suppliers. The outcomes may not 
always be happy ones (just as they were not in American affirmative action policy on 
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employment), but the desired outcome is that fruitful and economically efficient business 
relationships will evolve as the result of this pressure. The stories one hears of reluctant (and 
angry) Japanese firms buying inferior, low quality U.S. semiconductors because of MITI 
pressure and simply dumping them in the harbor may not be entirely apocryphal, but surely 
foreign market penetration did not rise from less than 10 percent to 20 percent on this basis. 
Unlike affirmative action, however, widespread use of managed trade could have a 
very detrimental impact on the principle of liberal trade. Hopefully, limited (in number and 
duration) episodes provide an example to the rest of Japanese industry concerning the 
desirability and profitability of increased dealings with foreign firms. 
The argument concerning managed trade pushing Japan in the wrong direction should 
not be ignored either. A VIE results from bilateral agreement, with the importing government 
implementing policies to yield the agreed-upon result. In 1986 and 1992, the Japanese 
government was willing to enter into such agreements (although it denies that the agreements 
actually represented VIEs), and many Americans see this willingness as logical or natural 
given the context of extensive government involvement with the private sector. However, this 
willingness may be changing. Some in Japanese society have disliked this pattern of 
government involvement and guidance, and now their voice is louder. In particular, Prime 
Minister Hosokawa and his coalition government appear to be genuinely interested in 
economic deregulation, and the domestic business community appears to support his 
initiatives. Earlier efforts at change, such as the Maekawa report of 1986, generally called for 
change for the sake of "international harmony." No nation undertakes major domestic reform 
in order to please other countries (except, perhaps, small developing countries with large debt 
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loads under pressure from the IMF). This time the pressures seems to be largely domestic; 
deregulation is desired in order to improve the efficiency and growth of the economy, a far 
more powerful rationale for generating policy change. 
Domestically motivated deregulation is an important development, and one which the 
U.S. government should encourage. However, I am not convinced that the mood for 
deregulation by itself will necessarily create a better reception for foreign firms and their 
products. The discussion in Japan is almost solely on economic deregulation, but often the 
regulatory obstacles for foreign firms have been excessive health or safety regulations being 
put to use as trade barriers. If these issues are not addressed, many problems will remain. 
Furthermore, much of the economic deregulation of interest to domestic industry may have 
little benefit for foreign firms. This suggests that an American government voice will be 
necessary in this process, ensuring that deregulation does not ignore the needs of foreign 
firms. 
Deregulation might also leave some problem areas because industrial policy will not 
disappear, and as long as the government has some favorite industries which it wishes to 
promote (such as super computers, medical equipment, telecommunications equipment, and 
other high technology industries), market access is likely to be a problem in those areas. 
Political deadlock between a resistant Japanese government and an insistent U.S. government 
may still lead to further episodes of managed trade as the only viable (but reluctant) solution 
to such problems even in the midst of an overall movement toward less regulation. One 
hopes, though, that the negative imagery acquired by VIEs in Japan due to the semiconductor 
and automobile parts episodes will lead the Japanese government to carry out traditional 
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rules-based changes which have a real impact on market penetration. 
On the other hand, the changed mood in Japan may actually help bring genuine 
openness in some problem areas where little progress has occurred in the past. In the 
construction sector, where a decade of pressure had achieved little, the Japanese government 
recently agreed to competitive bidding. In this case, the threat of retaliation under section 
301 of the U.S. Trade Law (plus the embarrassment of construction-related political scandals) 
led to a potentially important change without very much public squabbling.17 This is 
somewhat surprising given the past record of negotiations in this area, and the relatively 
radical approach pushed by the U.S. government. Whether this important change actually 
leads to real changes in behavior by those officials administering the contract system, and in 
increased penetration by foreign construction, engineering, and architectural firms remains to 
be seen. 
Focusing on VIEs may obscure what I feel has been a useful innovation in American 
policy. While some in the administration have certainly advocated extensive use of managed 
trade, the real shift has been the creation of a monitoring or follow up function in bilateral 
relations. Part of the problem and frustration on the part of American negotiators in the past 
has come from a failure to follow through on trade agreements. The use of "objective 
criteria" in the framework agreement is not managed trade; it is simply a sensible decision to 
monitor outcomes. Failure of statistics to show increased market penetration does not 
necessarily imply retaliation (although this can be a useful negotiating tool), but may imply 
the need for further negotiations to solve remaining problems. The system may also lead to 
17Paul Blustein, "Japan's Move Eases Threat of Sanctions," Washington Post October 27, 1993. 
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greater compliance with the newly negotiated rules, so that the Japanese side can attend these 
monitoring sessions and argue that whatever happened to the statistics, it could not be from 
failure to carry through the agreement. One wonders why such an approach was not put in 
place many years ago. 
The critics see monitoring as only a thinly disguised VIE policy. The implicit 
message in "objective criteria" is that market penetration statistics had better reach higher 
levels or else some form of retaliation may well materialize. That may be the case in some 
negotiations. But I believe that the larger impact will be to focus attention on the real 
implementation of rules-oriented agreements; real implementation should lead to real increases 
in market penetration by foreign firms in many of these cases. 
Conclusion 
The views expressed above add up to a rationale for continued American pressure on 
Japan on both the macroeconomic and microeconomic front. Important changes have taken 
place concerning market access in Japan over the past decade; doing business in Japan is 
easier today for many firms than a decade ago. Nevertheless, important asymmetries remain. 
As long as this is the case, Japan will find that international acceptance of its large current-
account surpluses will be weak, putting it under pressure to reduce those surpluses or 
undertake more thorough market opening measures. Support for liberal trade will erode if 
American firms continue to believe that they are unduly disadvantaged in the Japanese 
market. Solution to some of the more difficult problems may require radical departures from 
the principle of rules-based negotiations to include episodes of VIEs, although fear that the 
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Clinton administration will move heavily in this direction is unfounded. 
Despite the focus on problems in this paper, I remain fundamentally optimistic. Japan 
is changing; stagnation in the labor force, lower prospects for average economic growth, and 
the strengthened yen all point in the direction of higher import levels. Rising levels of travel, 
education, and work abroad create a more sophisticated citizenry less willing to tolerate high 
prices at home. Even with imbalances or asymmetries, the existing extensive nature of 
bilateral economic ties implies an underpinning of willingness to work out problems so that 
the relationship can expand. 
Noise, and considerable amounts of it, may simply be inevitable in this relationship. 
Just as every foolish violation of first amendment rights in the United States does not really 
have the dangerous "chilling effect" on the first amendment usually claimed by the ACLU, 
neither do the trade disputes or occasional managed trade solutions necessarily have a chilling 
effect on liberal trade. We will muddle through, and the long-run direction of change will 
continue to be in the direction of moderate increases in access to the Japanese market. 
